

726 strength of one tribe tried to rout the yelling horde of their adversary, and the first to run lost the battle. Captives were taken, tribute imposed, the temple burned, and the defeated group was then left alone again.

To attain victory more easily surprise attacks, sometimes implemented by a little treachery, were instituted. However, the cumbrous process of getting an army onto the field of battle usually prevented this favored method of warfare. More often the Tenochcas and their allies would feint with a screen of warriors, who would be easily repulsed in a pretended rout. The main body would wait in a place of concealment until the pursuing enemy came into view, whereupon they would charge out and demolish them. Losses were chiefly felt in the number of captives taken, since these short hand-to-hand combats were not very damaging to the man power of either side. [787] The capture of a chief or the recognition of a sign of evil portent was sufficient to demoralize an army and, despite their bravery and constant experience in warfare of this type, the Aztecs were little fitted to resist soldiers trained in European techniques.

- 723 There was rather more opportunity for strategy than for battle tactics. Considerable planning, as we have said, was necessary to move troops upon the field of battle. The Aztecs won campaigns in Oaxaca, Puebla, western Mexico and along the Vera Cruz coast, as far north as Tamaulipas.* Having to move step by step and to intimidate or win over town after town, they needed patience and knowledge of geographical and political conditions. One reason for the honor in which merchants were held was the information of this character which they could furnish from their travels.

*Ta-mow-le'e-pas.

The triple alliance was a typical example of Aztec strategy. 648
 Nezahualcoyotl wanted to restore the hegemony of Texcoco 723
 and destroy Tezozomoc's Tepanec power, the center of
 which was Azcapotzalco. The two towns were separated
 by the Lake of Mexico. To move troops overland would
 have required several days; to move them across the lake in
 canoes would have meant having a landing base on the
 western shore. Nezahualcoyotl, therefore, induced Tlacopan
 and Tenochtitlan, which were at the back door of Azcap-
 otzalco and tributary to it as well, to declare war. Thus he
 had a base at which to land his canoes filled with troops, and
 while his allies engaged the enemy strongly in this quarter,
 the Texcocan chief had time to bring reinforcements around
 the lakes by the overland route to attack another point.


The town of Chiconauhtla offers another example of these
 simple strategic ideas. This settlement dominated the straits
 through which the northern lakes of Zumpango and Xaltocan
 empty into Lake Texcoco. The people here could destroy
 any force in canoes moving east against Texcoco or west
 against Azcapotzalco. Their forces also could make a flank
 attack on land armies skirting the lakes against either of those
 two objectives. Early in the thirteenth century Chiconauhtla
 became a fief of Texcoco and participated, as a sort of
 guardian of the western marches, in campaigns against re-
 bellious western tribes and in the great war with Tezozomoc.
 Later it seems to have become part of the Tenochtitlan
 chain of vassal towns, and its chief had the honor of sharing
 a royal apartment in Montezuma's palace with the rulers of
 far more important city-states. To confirm this documentary
 evidence excavation of the site reveals, in the quantity and
 quality of the material culture surviving, evidence of partici-

- 723 pation in trade and booty far in excess of the apparent size
648 and importance of the town.¹¹ (See map, end papers; Plates 41, top; 42, top; 43.)

721 The purely economic and military aspects of war are as crude, when judged by our modern technical standards, as the rest of the purely mechanical aspects of Aztec life. On the other hand, the ritualistic conception of war as the earthly re-enactment of the titanic struggle between opposing forces in nature has a quality almost sublime. The political and economic frictions that brought about conflict were welcomed by the warriors as an opportunity to vibrate to the deep rhythms of nature, rhythms which met in a celestial antiphony in the Sacred War which the Sun fights each day as he, by his own death and sacrifice, ensures the life of man.

721 The War of Flowers was undertaken to satisfy this yearning
796 when no active campaign was in progress. In this incongruously named ceremonial combat the best warriors from several states met in a very real battle, so that feats of arms could be accomplished and captives taken to satisfy the hunger of the gods. One famous War of Flowers was repeated for several years, and the cream of the fighting men of Texcoco, Tenochtitlan and Tlacopan vied with the might of Cholula, Huexotcingo and Tlaxcala. If a warrior were captured he met the most glorious of deaths in direct sacrifice to the Sun. If he lived he gained renown. If he were slain, he [775] was cremated, an honor reserved only for fighting men and passed on to the special heaven where warriors dwell.¹²

726 Such warfare had no place in a conflict with Europeans, but, when reduced to fighting for their bare lives against the Spaniards, the Aztecs put up one of the most desperate de-



532

[291
302]

[43
714]

[293
286]

[701
714
793
411]

[723]

—After Paso y Troncoso

72-74. Women's array—*axpalli*, *enred* (Chapter 15). 75. Weaving and spinning equipment (Chapter 16). 76. Laying plans for war (Chapter 17). 77. The ruler's war array (Chapter 17). 78. Priests and warriors in battle array (Chapter 17).

[p. 36(I)]

[p. 36(H) is blank]



Seventeenth Chapter, in which are told the exercises of the rulers and how they might perform well their office and their government.

FIRST PARAGRAPH, where is told, as well, the ordering of those sent when war was waged.

The ruler was known as the lord of men. His charge was war. Hence, he determined, disposed, and arranged how war would be made.

First he commanded masters of the youths and seasoned warriors to scan the [enemy] city and to study all the roads—where [they were] difficult, where entry could be made through them. This done, the ruler first determined, by means of a painted [plan], how was placed the city which they were to destroy. Then the chief noted all the roads—where [they were] difficult, and in what places entry could be made.

Then he summoned the general and the commanding general, and the brave warriors, and he commanded them how they were to take the road, what places the warriors were to enter, for how many days they would march, and how they would arrange the battle. And he commanded that these would announce war and send forth all the men dexterous in war to be arrayed, and to be supplied with provisions for war and insignia.

The ruler then consulted with all the majordomos—the men of the Petlacalco¹ and of the Aztacalco, the majordomos of Quauhnauc and Uxtepec, and [those] of Cuertaxtlan, Tochpan, Tziuhcoac, Tepequaculco, Uxpan, Coatlintlaucan, Tlappan, Tlachco, Matlatzincan, Ocuillan, Xilotepec, Atotonilco, Axocapan, Itzacuncujtlapilco, Atocpan, and Ayotlantepec. He ordered them to take out all their [goods held in] storage, the tributes, costly articles—insignia of gold, and with quetzal feathers, and all the shields of great price.

And when the majordomos had delivered all the costly devices, the ruler then adorned and presented with insignia all the princes who were already able in war, and all the brave warriors, the men [at arms],

Injc castelli onome cap¹, vncan mjtca in jincic-643
hercolis in tlatoque: in quenjn vel quichiozque inte-
qujub, in jntlatocao.

INJC CE PARRAPHO: vncan mjtca, ioan in-643
tlatecpantalitli, in qujndanja injc iauqujcaia. 701

Injclatanaj, tlacatecutli, motocalotia: itequjuh catca
in iauicli, injc iehoatl qujzcomtequi, qujtecpana,
qujencahoa, in quenjn mochioz iauicli:

achto qujnaoatia in tiachahoa, in tequjoaque, in-643
connemjlia altepetl, in conjta, in quezquj vti, in 723
campa oujca, in campa ic calacoaz, in ie iuhquj achto
oqujnemjli in tlatoaj, tlapallacujjolpan ocomtali: in
altepetl, in poliuja, ie onjztica in tlatoaj in izqui [102]
vtli, in campa oujcan, quezqujcan in calacoaz.

Niman ic qujoalnotta: in tlacuchcalcatl, in tlaca-
teccatl, in tiachahoa qujnaoatia, in iuh teumacazque
in quezqujcan calacujz iauqujzaj, in quezqujhuil
monenemiz, in quenjn iautecoz: ioan qujnaoatia,
injc iehoantin, iautlatocque qujnaoatizque: in
jxqujch in quauhiloctlatl, injc mochichioaz, injc
mocencuaoaz: in jca iauitacatl, ioa tlaujztli.

Auh in iehoatl tlatoaj: njman qujnnonotza in-643
jxqujchtin calpixque, petlacalcatl, aztacalcatl: quauh 714
naoc calpixqui, oxtepec calpixqui, cuertlaxtecatl:
tochpanecatl: tziuhcoacatl, tepequacujlcatl, hoappa-
necatl, coaxitlacacatl, tlappanecatl, tlachotecatl,
matlatzincatl, ocujltecatl, xilotepecatl, atotonilcatl,
axocapanecatl, itzacuncujtlapilcatl, atocpanecatl, aio-
taintepecatl, qujnaoatia, injc qujoalcujzque, in
jxqujch in jnpiel, in tlacalqujlli, in tlacotlanquj
tlaujztli in cortic teucujtlaio, in quetzallo: in jxqujch
tlacochimalli.

Auh in joac oqujoaliquique in calpixque: in-643
jxqujch tlacotlanquj tlaujztli: iehoatl tlatoaj, nj- 701
man qujencaca qujntlaujzmasa in jxqujchtin tlaco-
pipilti, in ie imjaco ca iauitliltli: ioan in jxqujchtin

1. Cf. Andrieux and Dübbs, op. cit., II, p. 99; Sahagún, op. cit., I, p. 146; II, p. 311.

And he who in vain would save himself, implored and said to them: "What do you do, O Mexicans? I am not [the one]." They answered him: "Thou art [one of them] also, O fool; [art thou] not a carrier?" Then and there they slew him. They only [continued] to guard the people; they went about cautious of others. Their eyes and concern were only to guard the Mexicans. Many they punished for imagined [evil], those who perished without warning, whom they punished not for their own crime.

And still other carriers hid and sheltered themselves. No more were they to be seen; they showed themselves to no one; no longer would they come forth to the people. They were in great fright, swooning with fear. They lived hidden, lest they fall into the people's hands.

And when they laid siege to the Spaniards, for only seven days did they join battle with them in their quarters. And for twenty-three days they were shut in. And for as many days, the canals were dredged, widened, deepened, and made precipitous. Everywhere the canals were made dangerous and difficult. And on the roads, in various places, they erected barriers, laid walls, and placed ramparts. Passages between houses were made dangerous.

And when this had taken place:—

Auh in oc nen momaquixtinequi, in quintlatlaubtia quimilhuja. Tle amai mexicac, camono nehoatl: conilhuja, ca no tehoatl nocne, amo titequitqui: nj-man ie vacan cōmictia ca teixpāia, ca motecujtlavitinemj, ca imix intequiuh, ca tepia in mexica: ca mjequintin in tlapicli quitzacutiaque in jxpopoimjctiloque in amo vel intlalacul quitzacutiaque.

Auh in oc cequinti tequitque motlatique, mjnaxque, aocmo moteititāia, aocmo motenexitāia, aocmo tevic qujcaia, cenca momauhtiaia, mauhaconequja, mjnaxtinencia, inje amo temac vetzinque.

Auh in jquac oquincaltzacque in Española: can chicomilhuil in quincalicalque. Auh in caltzacutiatca cempoalilhujtl omei: auh izquilhujtl in, in acalotli motatatac, mopapatlah, movevecatlano, motetepexiqtz novian movicantlali, moovitili in acalotli: Auh in vli ipā, netetenantiloc, tenamjtl motetecac, netetenantlali, moovijcantlali in caltzalāli:

auh in ie iuhqui.

9. Chapter 21 ends with an interruption completed in the beginning of Chapter 22. Ángel María Garibay (*Historia de la literatura náhuatl*, II, p. 252), however, identifies the break as one of several instances. See also the ending of Chapter 33.

[p. 58 is blank]

f-57.



000 Twenty-second Chapter. Here is told how it became known that the Captain, Don Hernando Cortés, was coming, and that he was returning to Mexico.

—it became known that the Captain now was coming from Tepeyacac.¹ He had set forth bringing with him many Spaniards, and a great number of men of Tlaxcala and Cempoalla—many of them, large numbers, an abundance, a tremendous multitude, a great host. Not only [in numbers] were they coming, [but] they came to war; they came with devices, in war array, [with] their shields, obsidian-bladed swords, and wooden clubs borne upon their shoulders. They came stirring up a column of dust, [so that] their faces were covered and ashen with dust. They were caked with earth—clothed in dust, in much earth, [which] flaked off. In haste they ran and hurried here. They said, as they went: "Come along, O men of Tlaxcala! O men of Cempoalla!"

723 And the Mexicans determined among themselves that thereafter they would not be seen, but would hide and conceal themselves. As if the earth lay dead, they would speak aloud no more, [but] only remain spying out of entrances, openings in walls, and holes which in some measure they had pierced through walls, through which they could look out. Only those who had [houses] by the roadside—those along the edge of the road—could do so. But those who were among houses could not. [For] if the Spaniards had seen how many chieftains there were in some places, marshaled together, they would have thought in their hearts that the Mexicans would begin, start, and initiate the war.

And after this, [Cortés] went to and entered the palace; whereupon they shot off the guns.²

726 And when this had taken place, then [the Mexicans] came forth intent upon battle. Thereupon there were [war] cries and there was fighting; the fray was then joined; there was battle. Arrows and rocks fell upon the Spaniards.³

Ialc cempoalli omme capitulo: vncā mītoā in quenjn machitico in ie vitz capitan don hernādo Cortes injc oalmocuepaia mexico.

In omachitico in ie vitz in Capitan tepeiacapa in qujcaso, mjequjntin in quinoalhujac in Enefoles yoan cenca mjequjntin in tlaxcalteca yoā in cempoalteca vel mjequjntin vel ita jin, vel itachintin, vel tonac, vel tonaque: amo can iuh vallaque, valianaque, valmotavitzitiaeque, valmotachichihuaque, inchichimal, inmamauah, inmamavitzot quiquequequehotititze, teultli quipalxtitiaeque, omach ixtlaliuhque omachi yixtencuhque, omach moca tlalloaque, omach tereuhquimjliuhque, ca moca tlaltin, omach cocotzhaloā cenca oalmotlalo, cenca oalhujcinj, motratratzilitivi: qujtotivi, vallatotoca tlaxcalteca, cempoalteca.

Auh in Mexico monacotique, injc amo qujn motitiaeque, ca motlatizque, mjnaiaque, iuhqujn tlalli mjetimotecac, aocac naotzi, tel houllachielotoc in tlaxacujlcamac, yoan tepancamac, yoan tlacotoco achi qujcocoionique in tepandli, injc vmpa ontlachie: can ieboan in otenoaque, in otenli qujcatocque in juh qujchiuhque: auh in calsepanda onoque amo iuh qujchiuhque. Auh inla qujmjntanj in cana quetqujchtin manj, repeuhitmanj, in tlaacoen, ca iniol iuh tlamaizquja in Espafloca, ca in Mexico ieboan qujpenaltia, ieboan qujtzintia, ieboan inpaol in iniol.

Auh in ie iuhquj in ocalaquepo vei trepan: njman ie ic qujtladaqa in ttequjqujzti:

auh in ie iuhquj, njmā ie ic oalquica qujmaliztia in mjalizque: njmā ie ic tlaacoca, ie ic mcalica, njmā ie ic muchioa in iniol, njman ie ic tlacitolo onvetzi in mjal, in teli, in impan Espanola.

1. Tepeyacac: presumably not the site north of Tenochtitlan, but one between it and Tlaxcala.

2. Corresponding Spanish text: "consonaron a saber sobre los tiros en el campo de las que están ligadas, y para comenzar a las batallas."

3. The title is omitted in the Nahuatl text.

721 "Take heed, Malinche, for this City is ill disposed, and we
782 know that this night they have sacrificed to their Idol,
which is the God of War, seven persons, five of them
children, so that the God may give them victory over you,
and we have further seen that they are moving all their
baggage and women and children out of the city." When

721 Cortés heard this, he immediately sent these Tlaxcalans
back to their Captains, with orders to be fully prepared if
we should send to summon them, and he turned to speak
to the Cacique, priests and chieftains of Cholula and told
them to have no fear and show no alarm, but to remember
the obedience which they had promised to him, and not to
swerve from it, lest he should have to chastise them. That
he had already told them that we wished to set out on the
morrow and that he had need of two thousand¹ warriors
from the city to accompany us, just as the Tlaxcalans had
provided them, for they were necessary on the road. They

721 replied that the men would be given, and asked leave to go
● 723 at once to get them ready, and they went away very well
contented, for they thought that between the warriors
with whom they were to supply us, and the regiments
sent by Montezuma, which were hidden in the rocky
thickets and barrancas, we could not escape death or
capture, for the horses would not be able to charge
on account of certain breastworks and barricades which
they immediately advised the troops to construct, so that
only a narrow lane would be left through which it would be
impossible for us to pass. They warned the Mexicans to
be in readiness as we intended to start on the next day and
told them that they were going to give us two thousand²
warriors to accompany us, so that as we marched along,
off our guard, between the two forces our capture would

¹ "Blotted out "three or four."—G. G.

² Blotted out "four."—G. G.

FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE PLOT.

9

be sure and they would be able to bind us, and this they might look on as a certainty, for they [the Cholulans] had made sacrifices to their War Idols who had promised them victory. 721 723 ●

Let us cease speaking of this which they looked on as a sure thing and return to our Captain who, as he wished to be more thoroughly informed about the plot and all that was happening, told Doña Marina to take more chalchihuites to the two priests who had been the first to speak, for they were not afraid, and to tell them with friendly words that Malinche wished them to come back and speak to him, and to bring them back with her. Doña Marina went and spoke to the priests in the manner she knew so well how to use, and thanks to the presents they at once accompanied her. Cortés addressed them and asked them to say truly what they knew, for they were the priests of Idols and chieftains and ought not to lie, and that what they should say would not be disclosed in any manner, for we were going to leave the next morning, and he would give them a large quantity of cloth. They said the truth was that their Lord Montezuma knew that we were coming to their city, and that every day he was of many minds and could not come to any decision on the matter, that sometimes he sent to order them to pay us much respect when we arrived and to guide us on the way to his city, and at other times he would send word that it was not his wish that we should go to Mexico, and now recently his [Gods] Tescatepuca and Huichilobos, [787] to whom he paid great devotion, had counselled him that we should either be killed here in Cholula or should be sent, bound, to Mexico. That the day before he had sent out twenty thousand warriors, and half of them were already within this city and the other half were stationed near by in some gullies, and that they already knew that we were about to start to-morrow; they also

THE CHOICE OF ROAD.

29

491 town called Tlamanalco,¹ both of them subject to Mexico;
[636] that the one road was well swept and cleared so as to induce us to take it, and that the other road had been closed up and many great pines and other trees had been cut down so that horses could not use it and we could not march along it. That a little way down the side of the mountain along the road that had been cleared, the
491
723 Mexicans (thinking that we must take that road) had cut away a piece of the hill side, and had made ditches and barricades, and that certain squadrons of Mexicans had waited at that point so as to kill us there. So they counselled us not to go by the road which was clear, but by the road where the felled trees were, saying that they would send many men with us to clear it, and as the Tlascalans were also with us, between them they would clear away the trees, and they said that that road came out at Tlamanalco.

000 Cortés received their present very kindly and told them that he thanked them for the counsel they had given him, and that with God's help he would not abandon his march but would go the way they advised him. Early the next morning we began our march, and it was nearly midday when we arrived at the ridge of the mountain where we found the roads just as the people of Huexotzingo had said. There we rested a little and began to think about the Mexican squadrons on the intrenched hillside where the earth works were that they had told us about.

Then Cortés ordered the Ambassadors of the great Montezuma who came in our company to be summoned, and he asked them how it was that those two roads were

¹ Bernal Díaz seems to have gone wrong in his topography. At the gap between the two volcanoes the roads probably divided, one (to the right) going by way of Tlamanalco to Chalco, the other (more direct) going to Amecameca. The Spaniards probably took the more direct (the blocked up) road to Amecameca, and did not go to Tlamanalco at all. Cortés, in his second letter, says that he went to Amecameca, and does not mention Tlamanalco.